Journal of Business & Economic Policy

Games of Simultaneity Played by Perspective Rational Players Further thoughts on Ambiguity
Christoph Güttner

Abstract
The following article is based on Gordon Tullock´s (2005) analysis ofa coup d' état. Tullock pointed out that those who plan a coup are continually confronted with the challenge of communicating veiled in front of the ruling autocrat. Strategic interaction is therefore examined from a linguistic viewpoint. It presents the frame conditions that lead to ambiguous strategies as an optimal solution concept for rational actors. Formally, the situation can be seen as a conflictual environment, characterized by a cooperative and a non-cooperative fellow player. Plausible deniability plays an important role. The action set is based on a partition structure over different semantics to represent symbolic respectively ambiguous strategies. The two-level structure of the game, divided into a monitored frame game and a veiled language game, partly substitutes a probability distribution over ambiguous strategies. Games of Simultaneity can therefore be interpreted as a strategy interaction that takes place publicly and veiled at the same time.

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